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Article 
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs) 
Christopher A. Cotropia†, Jay P. Kesan†† & David 
L. Schwartz†††  
In the last decade, the landscape of patent litigation has 
radically shifted. Entities that do not manufacture products 
have become important players in the patent litigation system. 
This is a change from years ago, when patent litigation was 
dominated by lawsuits between competitors.1 In this earlier pe-
riod, there were complaints that the cost of patent litigation 
prohibited most small patent owners from enforcing their 
 
†  Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow, University of 
Richmond School of Law. We would like to thank David Abrams, Christopher 
Buccafusco, Colleen Chien, Peter DiCola, Robin Feldman, Miguel de 
Figueiredo, Christi Guerrini, Stuart Graham, Richard Gruner, Paul Heald, 
Paul Janicke, Ed Lee, Matthew Levy, Laura Pedraza-Feriña, Lee 
Petherbridge, Michael Risch, Matthew Sag, Ted Sichelman, Greg Vetter, 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Corey Yung, and the participants of the 2nd Annual 
Empirical Patent Law Conference at the University of Illinois College of Law, 
the Patent Reform: Theoretical Propositions and Factual Foundations Confer-
ence at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the Work-in-Progress IP 
Conference at Santa Clara, and faculty workshops at Northwestern University 
Law School and USC Gould School of Law for their comments and suggestions 
on prior drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank our student research 
assistants Lucas Dahlin, Michelle Ingram, John Li, and Andrew Thompson for 
their hard work and dedication. Finally, we would like to thank Docket Navi-
gator for providing us with its data relating to patent claim construction of all 
2010 lawsuits. 
†† Professor and H. Ross & Helen Workman Research Scholar, Universi-
ty of Illinois College of Law.  
††† Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Empirical Studies 
of Intellectual Property, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
  Copyright © 2014 by Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, and Da-
vid L. Schwartz. 
 1. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: 
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1571 (2009) (describing various plaintiff-defendant matchups and their 
frequency of occurrence in patent litigation). 
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rights against large entities. Today, companies that manufac-
ture products embodying their patents urge that patent plain-
tiffs that do not manufacture products are fundamentally dif-
ferent. The main argument is that there are asymmetric 
stakes.2 In a patent lawsuit when both plaintiffs and defend-
ants are manufacturers, defendants can cross-license patents 
or hit back at plaintiffs with their own patent infringement 
lawsuit, a strategy that is unavailable with a non-
manufacturing plaintiff. As a result, non-manufacturing plain-
tiffs in the patent system are seen as opportunistic actors who 
sue manufacturing companies for money.  
The recent entrants, often-called “patent assertion entities” 
(“PAEs”),3 non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), patent monetiza-
tion entities (“PMEs”),4 or simply patent trolls, come in many 
shapes and sizes. They run the gamut from universities, failed 
start-ups, and individual inventors, to companies formed by 
venture capitalists seeking to exploit the inventions of others.5 
From the perspective of a patent as an economic instrument 
designed to provide rewards for inventors, it is important to 
carefully separate these specific categories of PAEs. There is 
little economic support for the proposition that individual in-
ventors and university personnel should not benefit from the 
patent system.6 Similarly, start-up companies that subsequent-
ly fail to commercialize their patented technologies also urge 
that they should be allowed to monetize their patents through 
litigation when other companies deploy the start-up’s patented 
technologies in their products.7 Other entities in the patent sys-
tem who help individuals, universities, and failed start-ups 
monetize their patents also urge that they are important in-
termediaries bringing resources to inventors to help them mon-
 
 2. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the 
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2162 (2013). 
 3. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
297, 300 (2010). 
 4. Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents 
Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012). 
 5. Some studies have attempted to classify parties using a dozen entity 
status categories. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, 
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Pa-
tents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009). 
 6. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION 2 (2013) [hereinafter “EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT”]. 
 7. See id. at 3.  
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etize their patents.8 We recognize that there are various names 
that people use to refer to these entities.9 In this Article, we re-
fer to all of these entities as PAEs, except when referring to the 
studies of others who call them by a different name. 
Most recently, there has been a ferocious backlash in many 
sectors of society against PAEs. Some academics and practi-
tioners have argued forcefully that PAEs are bad, that their 
conduct is costly, and that they are socially harmful to the 
economy.10 The President of the United States has even joined 
in the fray. In response to a question about “patent trolls,” 
President Obama recently stated, “They don’t actually produce 
anything themselves . . . . They are essentially trying to lever-
age and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort 
some money out of them.”11 To counter patent trolls, the Presi-
dent and his economic team issued an executive order, includ-
ing some legislative recommendations, to make litigation more 
difficult for patent holders.12 Academics have contended that 
PAEs cost the economy tens of billions of dollars, based upon a 
confidential survey of defendants.13 The press trumpeted an-
 
 8. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Re-
marks of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Competition Law & Patent Assertion 
Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do (June 20, 2013) available at 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130620paespeech.pdf (“Rewarding genuine in-
vention is good for competition and consumers. PAEs can serve that goal by 
reducing the enforcement hurdles facing small inventors and start-ups . . . . 
PAEs can make it easier for a failed start-up to monetize its patents, providing 
some insurance for venture capitalists.”). 
 9. Some refer to all or some NPEs as “trolls.” For instance, some believe 
troll refers to a case brought by an NPE which is meritless. Others believe 
troll refers to a case brought by an NPE for a nuisance value settlement. Oth-
ers believe that all cases brought by an NPE are troll cases, regardless of the 
merits. While the terms PME and PAE are meant to exclude University patent 
litigation, it is less clear whether Individual Inventor lawsuits are included. 
For an empirical project such as ours, the definition of an NPE is key.  
 10. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 129 (2010). See gener-
ally James Bessen & Michael Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014) (discussing the costs of patent litigation). 
 11. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls To Protect American Innova-
tion, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation. 
 12. See Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators To Root Out “Patent 
Trolls,” N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/ 
business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.html; EXECUTIVE OFFICE RE-
PORT, supra note 6 (discussing data findings regarding PAE litigation). 
 13. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 389. For a critique of the methods 
used in that study, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role 
SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:19 PM 
652 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:649 
 
other study that found patent trolls filed 62% of patent law-
suits in 2012, a huge increase from the 29% filed in 2010.14 RPX 
Corporation (RPX) and Patent Freedom, two companies whose 
business includes providing subscriptions for businesses facing 
PAE assertions of patent infringement, have each reported 
summaries of their proprietary data on PAEs.15  
While the rhetoric in these studies is often sharp and clear, 
the same cannot also be said for the disclosures of the underly-
ing data. The studies merely provide summary data to the pub-
lic and often do not differentiate between the various types of 
PAEs. Instead, the studies broadly classify companies as either 
PAEs or non-PAEs (or sometimes, trolls or non-trolls). Im-
portantly, nearly all of the data upon which these studies are 
premised is confidential and thus is not available for peer re-
view or for use in other studies.16 This includes the data used in 
the Executive Office Report. In late August 2013, the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (“GAO”) released its long-awaited 
report on NPEs.17 That report, while appearing quite balanced 
 
of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 
(2014). 
 14. See Steven Musil, Patent Trolls Now Behind Most Patent Infringement 
Lawsuits, CNET (Dec. 10, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3 
-57558384-93/patent-trolls-now-behind-most-patent-infringement-lawsuits 
(“About 62 percent of all patent lawsuits filed this year up to December 1 were 
brought by patent assertion entities (PAEs), which are created to extract li-
censing fees from other companies rather than make products based on the 
patents.”); Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 
14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html. 
 15. See, e.g., RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY REPORT (2013), available at 
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2013/07/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC692
59E7.pdf. Patent Freedom’s publicly available website contains summary data 
on NPE assertions. See, e.g., Litigations Over Time, PATENT FREEDOM, 
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014). Moreover, Steven J. Moore, a legal practitioner at the Kelley Drye law 
firm, wrote a five-part series on the popular blog IPWatchdog about NPEs. In 
the posts, he reported summary data on a variety of NPE related issues that 
appear to contradict the anti-patent troll narrative. See, e.g., Steve Moore, 
Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths—A Fractured Fairytale Part 2, IPWATCHDOG 
(July 30, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10 
-patent-troll-myths-a-factured-fairytale-part-2/id=43754. 
 16. We understand that Stanford Law School is in the early staging of or-
ganizing a publicly available database of litigated patent owner information, 
including classification of entities that own the underlying patents. We have 
agreed to contribute our data to this worthwhile effort. We understand that 
some or all of the data from the Feldman et al. article will also be contributed 
to the public database. 
 17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AS-
SESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
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and thoughtful, has several shortcomings. The GAO analyzed 
data from patent lawsuits initiated between 2007 and 2011, 
which means that it lacked meaningful data after the effective 
date, in late 2011, of the America Invents Act.18 The GAO re-
port also did not disclose its underlying data. Because the un-
derlying data is never released in any of the prior studies, other 
researchers cannot often determine which entities were classi-
fied as PAEs or NPEs, what revenue numbers were associated 
with these entities, and other information necessary to fully 
evaluate the claims. This information is critical to verify, as a 
policy matter, whether PAEs are engaging in strategic and op-
portunistic behavior that does not benefit anyone except them.19 
Defenders of PAEs have offered several purported benefits. 
They claim that PAEs provide liquidity in the marketplace for 
patents.20 They permit inventors who are otherwise excluded 
from the marketplace—because, for instance, they are individ-
uals who cannot manufacture products, or they are companies 
that tried yet failed to manufacture—to obtain some return on 
their investment.21 Even when these entities sell their patents 
to another to enforce, they are receiving something for their ef-
forts. According to this argument, without the market for pa-
tents, these inventors would remain uncompensated for their 
contributions. Furthermore, PAEs are claimed to be specialists 
in patent enforcement who are skilled in evaluating allegations 
of infringement and hiring and supervising law firms to keep 
costs down. PAEs also have resources to cover litigation ex-
penses.22 Under this theory, PAEs assert lawsuits that have a 
reasonable likelihood of succeeding and which are expected to 
yield recoveries above out-of-pocket litigation expenses.  
 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 4. The GAO Report hypothesizes without data that the increase 
in litigation in the end of 2011 was because patent owners anticipated the pas-
sage of the AIA, which restricted the number of accused infringers who could 
be joined in a single lawsuit. Id. at 15.  
 19. We also note that lawsuits do not represent the complete story of pa-
tent disputes. Some disputes are clearly raised and either settled or dropped 
without court intervention. We have no means to evaluate the quantity or ef-
fect of cease and desist letters sent by patent holders, despite their potential 
importance. This correspondence between private parties is confidential and 
not available to research in all but the rarest of circumstances.  
 20. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 
(2012); Shrestha, supra note 10, at 126–28. 
 21. See sources cited supra note 20. 
 22. Risch, supra note 20, at 494. 
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To us, the fundamental barrier to thoroughly understand-
ing these competing narratives is the lack of granular and 
transparent data that attempts to properly account for the var-
ious types of PAEs. In addition, no other PAE study, to our 
knowledge, has publicly released the underlying data. Other 
studies maintain their datasets as confidential or otherwise 
have not yet released the data.23 This present study overcomes 
this barrier. 
We have classified all patent holder litigants from calendar 
years 2010 and 2012, and we are releasing this data to the pub-
lic. We have attempted to drill down and finely classify the na-
ture of the litigants, beyond the simple PAE or non-PAE defini-
tions. Broad definitions of trolls or PAEs surely cause higher 
numbers. We believe that providing data to the public that un-
packs the definition of PAE can provide better illumination to 
policy makers, researchers, and others interested in the patent 
litigation system. It will enable researchers to properly tailor 
investigations to the specific question they are considering. And 
if one believes that all PAEs, however defined, are bad, then 
one can aggregate our classifications to analyze data.  
Our dataset, which took months to gather and code, in-
cludes 2,520 lawsuits from 2010 and 5,185 lawsuits from 2012. 
We classified each patent holder as an Operating Company, 
University, Individual Inventor, Patent Aggregator, Technology 
Development Company, Failed Start-up, IP Holding Subsidiary 
of an Operating Company, or Patent Holding Company.24 In 
addition, we obtained information about the underlying patents 
and technologies involved in the lawsuits. 
Our data provides a rich account of changes in patent liti-
gation in the last few years, considering both the increase in 
the number of patent lawsuits and their interaction with the 
new laws that have come into effect under the America Invents 
Act (AIA). Our most basic descriptive findings are inconsistent 
with, and call into serious question, the summary data provid-
ed by RPX, Patent Freedom, and other academics. Our data re-
veals a much lower percentage of litigation brought by Patent 
 
 23. Some of the data is owned by RPX and Patent Freedom. These are for-
profit businesses that earn money, in part, because of the data that they have 
compiled. We understand their legitimate business desire to maintain the data 
as secret. However, if a business elects to maintain its data as secret, then we 
believe the data should be severely discounted in debates about public policy. 
As academics, we do not have these financial incentives with respect to data. 
 24. A full description of each of these types of patent holders is found in 
Part II. 
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Holding Companies than other studies. In fact, for the most 
part, we find that there has not been any explosion of PAE liti-
gation between 2010 and 2012, as others have reported. We 
find, instead, that most of the differences between the years are 
likely explained by, and attributable to, a change in the joinder 
rules adopted in 2011 as part of the America Invents Act. To be 
sure, the data is slightly complicated, and we do find a modest 
increase in PAE litigation, especially if one uses a narrow defi-
nition of PAEs (including only non-original inventors—Patent 
Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators). But overall, the 
often-repeated “explosion” of PAE litigation from 2010 to 2012 
is almost completely a myth. 
Our data reveals a modest increase in the number of Pa-
tent Holding Companies and in the number of Individual In-
ventor suits. We also find that when we repackage all PAEs in-
to a single category, they are responsible for a majority of 
accused infringers sued for patent infringement in 2012. We 
note that many of the patent law changes currently proposed 
will negatively impact Individual Inventors. Individual Inven-
tors are rarely explicitly described as trolls but are often in-
cluded in the counts of ‘bad’ lawsuits. If one believes that the 
focus should be on speculators who purchase patents from oth-
ers for the purposes of enforcement, then the data on such indi-
viduals should be studied.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. In 
Part I, we explain several theories on why PAEs are beneficial 
or detrimental to the patent system. These theories outline dis-
tinct categories of patent holders who enforce their patents. 
Transforming the distinct categories into a coding scheme, we 
detail in Part II the methodology we used to generate the da-
taset. Part III provides descriptive statistics of 2010 and 2012 
patent litigation. We discuss implications of the data, including 
points of disagreement between our data and the data of oth-
ers, in Part IV. We also describe some areas of future study, 
many of which we are presently undertaking. Finally, we pro-
vide a brief conclusion.  
I.  THEORIES RELATING TO PAES   
There are numerous theories on the role of PAEs in the pa-
tent system. As mentioned in the introduction, many people 
(including President Obama’s economic team) contend that 
PAEs “significantly retard innovation in the United States and 
result in economic ‘dead weight loss’ in the form of reduced in-
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novation, income, and jobs for the American economy.”25 They 
assert that PAEs hold up legitimate innovators by demanding 
undeserved rents. Opponents of PAEs point to other “unfair” 
aspects of PAE litigation that stem from the fact that PAEs do 
not manufacture any products. For instance, PAEs are immune 
from a potential weapon used by accused infringers—
counterclaims of patent infringement—because they make no 
products that may potentially infringe a patent.26 Furthermore, 
because PAEs do not manufacture products, they have fewer 
relevant documents.27 In litigation, the discovery obligations 
are asymmetric, with it costing more to defend a PAE lawsuit 
than to prosecute one.28 Supporters of PAEs allege that these 
entities serve a useful role as intermediaries with skills at 
monetizing patents, something that many original patent own-
ers lack.29 But sometimes, the arguments are more nuanced. To 
untangle these conflicting economic rationales and dueling nar-
ratives, the definition of PAE needs to be unpacked and the 
specific categories of actors within the PAE category and each 
actor’s behavior in litigation needs to be analyzed separately. 
An initial question is whether Universities should be in-
cluded within a definition of PAE. University faculty and grad-
uate students are often viewed as important contributors to in-
novation and scientific research. However, Universities are 
undeniably “non-practicing”; they do not directly commercialize 
their inventions. A technical definition of PAE or NPE would 
include Universities, although many scholars believe Universi-
ties should not be included.30 
Moving beyond Universities, should Individual Inventors 
enforcing their own patents be considered PAEs? Again, these 
individuals are non-practicing in that they are not manufactur-
ing products. Some consider them bad actors and “patent 
trolls.”31 But the story of the garage inventor, “working against 
 
 25. EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. 
 26. See id. at 4. 
 27. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2162. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Risch, supra note 20, at 459. 
 30. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (arguing that uni-
versities should not be deemed trolls); Risch, supra note 20, at 468. 
 31. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in 
Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 173 (2007) (“In 
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all odds to provide society with amazing technological break-
throughs” is part of the American dream.32 And if an important 
benefit of PAEs is their roles as intermediaries skilled at mone-
tizing patents, it is strange to include the original individual 
patent inventors, who are by definition not intermediaries. 
Failed companies, including Failed Start-ups and Failed 
Operating Companies, also are a distinct type of PAE. At one 
point, these companies either manufactured products or seri-
ously attempted to break into the market. For some reason, 
these entities failed at selling or developing products or ser-
vices. They retained their original patents, and later seek to en-
force them. To proponents of PAEs and entrepreneurship in 
general, Failed Start-ups that enforce their patents are a posi-
tive.33 The revenue from patent monetization permits some re-
turn to the original corporate backers and investors, who oth-
erwise would receive no money.34 By providing an alternative 
method of returning money to investors, patent enforcement 
helps the investment ecosystem.35 Critics of PAEs argue that 
very few start-ups plan or ever make money from enforcing 
their patents.36 They argue that start-ups are more likely to be 
on the receiving, rather than asserting, end of a PAE dispute.37 
Another category includes companies that develop technol-
ogy largely for the purposes of licensing to others. These com-
panies are like idea labs, which rely upon patents to protect the 
inventions. They are separate from Individual Inventors be-
cause they use a corporate structure to bring together numer-
ous employee inventors. But they are original owners of the 
technology, and for the most part they do not practice the tech-
nology by making products and/or offering services based on 
 
contrast, the so-called patent trolls are often individual inventors or small 
startups.”). 
 32. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of 
the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54 (2009). 
 33. Risch, supra note 20, at 491. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepre-
neurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009) (analyzing a survey of early-stage technolo-
gy companies regarding why they patent).  
 36. See generally COLLEEN V. CHIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., PATENT ASSER-
TION AND STARTUP INNOVATION (2013), available at http://newamerica.net/ 
sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20and%20Startup
%20Innovation_updated.pdf (discussing benefits and costs of patent assertion 
litigation to start-up companies and venture capitalists). 
 37. Id. 
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their patented technologies. These Technology Development 
Companies fit as PAEs in some definitions, but not others. 
Some definitions of PAEs exclude the original owner of the 
patents. The argument is that financial speculators are pur-
chasing patents not with the goal of enhancing knowledge or 
encouraging commercialization, but rather merely to obtain fi-
nancial returns (i.e., rent-seeking). Others counter that these 
speculators are creating a market for patents to enable Indi-
vidual Inventors to receive some compensation, when none was 
previously available.38 These financial speculators, presumably 
financed by Wall Street, take two potential forms. First, they 
may purchase a single patent or small portfolio of patents. The-
se speculators form essentially a shell corporation—a Patent 
Holding Company—to hold title to the patents without other 
substantial assets. Then, the Patent Holding Company aggres-
sively asserts the patents against an industry. The Patent 
Holding Company’s legal fees are relatively low in patent litiga-
tion because it has essentially no documents to produce.39 Con-
sequently, its discovery costs are low. Moreover, the Patent 
Holding Company litigates overly aggressively because it has 
no reputational concerns that an Operating Company may have 
when asserting its patents.40  
A second type of speculator is the Mass or Large Patent 
Aggregator. The Mass Patent Aggregator acquires a large port-
folio of patents, sometimes alleged to be as large as 80,000 pa-
tents.41 Aggregators then assert the entire portfolio against es-
tablished industry participants. Critics of these entities claim 
that they are a tax on production, unnecessarily raise rivals’ 
costs, and engage in potential anticompetitive conduct.42 Others 
tepidly defend Mass Aggregators by arguing that Aggregators 
reduce transaction costs for companies needing to clear a signif-
icant number of patent rights.43 According to this narrative, 
 
 38. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 31, at 172–73. 
 39. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2162. 
 40. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
 41. Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Ventures and its 80,000 Patents, PATENT-
LY-O (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/intellectual 
-ventures-and-its-80000-patents.html.  
 42. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 25–28 (2012).  
 43. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2157. “Royalty stacking” refers to 
situations in which a single product potentially infringes many patents and 
thus may require multiple royalty payments. The term “royalty stacking” re-
flects the fact that, from the perspective of the company making the product in 
question, all of the different claims for royalties must be added or “stacked” 
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Mass Aggregators reduce the number of negotiations, which in 
turn reduces “royalty stacking.”44 Thus, according to theory, the 
total payment by those needing licenses would be lower when 
negotiating with a Mass Aggregator than when negotiating 
with numerous smaller Patent Holders.45 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) opened an investi-
gation into certain PAEs, presumably ones that acquire patents 
from others.46 One concern of the FTC is that an insufficient 
portion of the recoveries from patent assertions is provided to 
the inventors and innovators. Instead, the argument is that the 
middlemen—contingent lawyers, venture capitalists, and oth-
ers—siphon off almost all of the money. Almost none of the 
money purportedly returns to the deserving party, the original 
inventor. However, the financial arrangements between the 
original owner, subsequent owners, their managers, and attor-
neys are typically confidential and not available for review. As 
a result, it is difficult to determine the percentage of the royalty 
income that is returned to the original inventors. Nevertheless, 
the FTC, through its 6(b) subpoena power, can theoretically ob-
tain this sort of information from the parties that are involved 
in these transactions. 
The FTC’s concern highlights an important issue in the 
study of PAEs: not all of the criticisms in the press apply to all 
categories of PAEs. The FTC’s concern pertains only to a subset 
of PAEs. It does not apply to Individual Inventors and Failed 
Start-ups enforcing their own patents. Those groups obtain all, 
or substantially all, of the recoveries from the lawsuits. Other 
entities, such as Patent Holding Companies that purchase pa-
tents in order to monetize them, fall within the desired criti-
cism that the FTC hopes to investigate. Furthermore, Large 
Patent Aggregators fall within the FTC’s concern.  
In sum, there are numerous distinct types of patent hold-
ers who may assert their rights. These include Universities, 
Individual Inventors, Failed Start-ups, Technology Develop-
 
together to determine the total royalty burden that is borne by the product if 
the firm is to sell that product without engaging in patent infringement. Id. at 
2148. 
 44. Id. at 2157. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Edward Wyatt, Inventive, at Least in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2013, at B1 (noting that the FTC “is expected to begin a sweeping investiga-
tion” of patent assertion entities that use shell companies when they sue); see 
also Ramirez, supra note 8 (“I believe that the Commission should use its 6(b) 
authority to study the costs and benefits of PAE activity.”). 
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ment Companies, Patent Holding Companies, Mass Patent Ag-
gregators, as well as Operating Companies. The argument 
about the costs and benefits of PAEs vary for the different 
types of patent holders, with some arguments only being appli-
cable to a subset of all patent holders. In this empirical work, 
as we elaborate in the next section, we have kept careful track 
of the various types of patent holders and their involvement in 
patent litigation in the recent past.  
II.  STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY   
In this Part, we convert the distinct categories of patent 
holders we set forth in Part I into a usable taxonomy of PAEs 
for our empirical study. Because the definitions we used are es-
sential to our study, this part explains in detail the techniques 
used to collect and classify the data. It then reports some basic 
parameters of the data set. We also report various statistical 
measures of reliability. To permit others to evaluate our coding 
and to use the data for other studies, we have made the data 
set available at http://www.npedata.com.47 
A. THE CODERS 
Because the data is both central to the article and difficult 
to code, the authors personally coded all of the lawsuits.48 We 
did not delegate the task to our student RAs. We did not out-
source the job to foreigners unfamiliar with patents and the 
U.S. litigation system.49 Instead, each of the three authors 
spent a significant amount of time coding the identities of the 
patent holders.  
We believe that our previous experience relating to data, 
patents, and litigation was an important advantage in coding 
the lawsuits. Each of the authors practiced as a patent attorney 
before becoming a full time academic. Together, we have over 
twenty years’ experience in practicing patent litigation, repre-
senting both practicing and non-practicing entities, and over 
 
 47. We have released the raw data we obtained from PACER that permits 
identification of the case, along with our categorization of the type of entity. 
PACER is a federal government-operated service providing access to electronic 
court records. 
 48. As used in this article, we use the term “case” and “lawsuit” inter-
changeably. Both terms refer to a dispute that was assigned a particular civil 
action number by the courts. 
 49. We do not know who RPX and Patent Freedom rely upon to classify 
parties in their database, but we suspect experienced patent litigators are not 
personally performing the coding.  
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thirty years academic experience in studying patent litigation. 
In addition, our collective experience includes serving as legal 
and technical experts in patent litigation and presiding over 
patent litigation as a special master. We have each separately 
conducted empirical studies of patent litigation and previously 
engaged in large scale coding projects.50 We believe that our 
prior experience adds important validity to our study. Many of 
the coding decisions require detailed knowledge of patent liti-
gation and civil procedure, two topics on which student coders 
and inexpensive foreign labor would be particularly deficient. 
Other coding decisions inherently require some subjective 
judgment.51 We believe that our collective experience provides 
us substantial value in coding. Furthermore, we have benefit-
ted from reviewing the coding schema used by other academics. 
These provide us both with a roadmap of potential coding 
 
 50. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Pa-
tent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009); Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining 
Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Re-
view, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. 
Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. 
POL’Y 844 (2013); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal 
Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
911 (2007); Christopher A. Cotropia, Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, 
Patent Applications and the Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 179 (2013); Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the 
International Trade Commission As a Patent Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 1 (2011); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Re-
solved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Pa-
tent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. 
Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudica-
tion: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393–467 (2011); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The 
Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2009); Jay P. 
Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169 (2009); David L. 
Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L. 
Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empir-
ical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 223 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpreta-
tion Review Deference or Correction Driven? (Feb. 7, 2014) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).  
 51. We note that the government disagreed with 29 out of 500 classifica-
tions made by Lex Machina. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 52 (“We found 
29 cases where we differed with Lex Machina’s original classification. They 
adjusted their classifications in all but five of the cases.”). 
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schema and choices, as well as aspects we thought could be im-
proved.52  
B. IDENTIFYING RELEVANT LAWSUITS 
The data set assembled for the present study includes in-
formation from all patent infringement lawsuits filed in two 
complete calendar years: 2010 and 2012. The raw data from 
these years includes 3,553 and 5,600 lawsuits, respectively. We 
wanted two separate years so we could compare them. The year 
2010 was well-suited for study because a majority of the law-
suits filed then have since been resolved, thus permitting us to 
investigate outcomes, settlements, and other information relat-
ing to the litigation. The year 2012 provides a more recent 
snapshot.  
The year 2011 was poorly suited for empirical study, in our 
opinion, because the America Invents Act (“AIA”) was adopted 
in September of that year.53 The AIA included a revision to the 
joinder rules for patent litigation, which requires lawsuits filed 
against multiple unrelated parties to be filed separately.54 For 
example, in 2010, while you could sue three defendants in one 
patent lawsuit in some venues, after the passage of the AIA, 
you may have to sue each defendant separately, resulting in 
three patent lawsuits. After the negotiated language of the AIA 
was released to the public and before the President signed it in-
to law, there appeared to be a rush to the courthouse to file be-
fore the new rules were effective.55 Indeed, in those few days in 
September, over 800 defendants were sued for patent infringe-
ment.56 Because of both the change of law that occurred during 
the year and the uncommon spike in filings before the adoption 
of the AIA, we chose to exclude 2011. We suspect that many of 
the cases filed in September 2011 would have otherwise been 
brought later in 2011, and that some of them may have been 
filed in 2012 (or not filed at all). We do not believe that the Sep-
 
 52. See, e.g., Jeruss et al., supra note 4, at 364–72; Robin Feldman, Tom 
Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetiza-
tion Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 16–37, available at 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2013/041024-Feldman.pdf. 
 53. Act of Sept. 16, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
 54. See id. § 299 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012)).  
 55. Dennis Crouch, Rush to Judgment: New Dis-Joinder Rules and Non-
Practicing Entities, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.patentlyo 
.com/patent/2011/09/rush-to-judgment-new-dis-joinder-rules-and-non-
practicing-entities.html. 
 56. Id. 
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tember 2011 spike substantially affects our results from 2012 
and some data supports our belief,57 but at this point, we cannot 
rule it out.58 
We do not believe that parties in 2010 anticipated the pas-
sage of the AIA, particularly the joinder provision. Patent re-
form bills had been introduced in Congress every year since 
2005, becoming progressively more watered down each year.59 
There was no indication or expectation that a bill would ever 
pass.60 Furthermore, the joinder provision of the AIA was not 
present in the patent reform bills under debate in 2010 or ear-
lier.61 In fact, the joinder provision was added to the bill that 
became the AIA in a final mark-up before passage, with little 
notice or debate.62 
We used Bloomberg Law’s Federal Docket Database to 
identify the patent lawsuits filed in these years.63 We under-
stand that Bloomberg Law obtains its data from PACER.64 As a 
check on Bloomberg’s comprehensiveness, we manually com-
pared the results of a search of patent infringement lawsuits 
 
 57. We have analyzed the monthly lawsuit filings in January, February, 
and March in 2010 and 2012 by entity type. The pattern of filings appears to 
be the same, with March being the highest month in both years. We also con-
sidered whether January 2012 appeared to be artificially low, at least com-
pared to January 2010, for filings involving patent holding companies. If Jan-
uary 2012 was low, it would be consistent with cases that would be filed in 
early 2012 having been accelerated and filed just before the passage of the AIA 
in September 2011. After investigating, January 2012 did not appear to be ar-
tificially low. 
 58. To fully consider the spike, one would need to gather and classify the 
patent litigation data from 2011 using our coding. 
 59. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons 
Learned, REGULATION, Winter 2012–13, at 20, 20. 
 60. See id. 
 61. For a summary of the key provisions in the proposed Patent Reform 
Act of 2010, see Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PA-
TENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform 
-act-of-2010-an-overview.html. Even the patent reform bills introduced earlier 
in 2011 did not contain the provision on joinder. See S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011), 
available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/02/patentreformactof2011 
asreported.pdf. 
 62. David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 655–56 
(2013). 
 63. We limited the docket search on Bloomberg Law to lawsuits from be-
tween January 1 and December 31 of the given year. We used the Nature of 
Suit field to isolate “830 – Patent” cases. 
 64. Ask a Librarian: Court Documents and PACER Access, HARV. L. SCH. 
LIBR., http://asklib.law.harvard.edu/a.php?qid=39345 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014).  
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from Bloomberg with an analogous search from PACER.65 We 
found that the Bloomberg results were over 99% accurate in the 
sample we reviewed and, in fact, appeared to capture consoli-
dated matters slightly more accurately than PACER’s raw da-
ta.66 Consequently, we felt comfortable using Bloomberg’s da-
taset of patent infringement cases.  
For every lawsuit, we reviewed the docket report and a 
copy of the complaint. The docket report is a list of the papers 
filed with, or generated by, the court in the case.67 It includes 
the title and associated date of each entry from the initial com-
plaint until the lawsuit is terminated.68 The complaint is the le-
gal document that initiates a lawsuit.69 While the complaint is 
frequently light on facts, it sometimes has information about 
the parties, including the patent holder.70  
After reviewing these documents, we eliminated several 
types of cases from the data set. First, we excluded all cases in 
which the sole cause of action was patent false marking.71 
 
 65. We limited our search in PACER to Nature of Suit “830 – Patent” as 
we did in Bloomberg Law. 
 66. We reviewed patent lawsuits initiated between January 1, 2012 and 
March 1, 2012 in both databases. There were only 7 inconsistencies in 778 rec-
ords. These 7 inconsistencies all were from two groups of lawsuits. In the first, 
involving Brandeis University, there were a set of cases filed in the Western 
District of Wisconsin and Northern District of Illinois between the same par-
ties. Bloomberg Law merges these into a single lawsuit, specifically the one 
that was pursued. In the second, PACER has two lawsuits with sequential 
docket numbers (9:12-CV-80037 and 9:12-CV-80038) between the same parties 
in the same district. Bloomberg Law only includes one of these lawsuits. For 
all of these inconsistencies, we believe that Bloomberg Law’s data is better 
suited for our purposes than the original PACER data. As discussed in more 
detail below, we believe that consolidated cases should not be double counted. 
 67. See generally Dockets, BLOOMBERG L., http://www.bna.com/ 
bloomberglaw/dockets/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Complaint, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
complaint/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
 70. Id.; see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8–10.  
 71. False marking disputes are cases in which someone, often a member 
of the general public, complains that a company labeled its product as “patent-
ed,” when in fact, no unexpired patent covered the product. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 292 (2012). The issues in Patent false marking cases are quite different from 
disputes about whether a party infringes a patent. For instance, the validity of 
the patent is not at issue in patent false marking cases. See R. Mark 
McCareins & Peter Slawniak, Current State of Patent False Marking Litiga-
tion, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., May 2011, at 3, 3. Many of the cases in-
volved companies that, without bad intent, continued to mark their products 
with a patent number even though the patent had expired. See id. In these 
cases, infringement was not at issue either. See id. Furthermore, none of the 
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There were 666 patent false marking cases, which we manually 
excluded in 2010. The AIA effectively eliminated nearly all 
false marking cases.72 We did not find any false marking dis-
putes in the 2012 data.  
Second, we excluded all cases in which the only patents as-
serted were design patents. The current debate about PAEs is 
about utility patents, not design patents.73 If a lawsuit involved 
allegations of both utility and design patent infringement, we 
retained the lawsuit in the data set. Excluding design-patent-
only lawsuits resulted in 184 lawsuits being dropped in 2010 
and 176 lawsuits being dropped in 2012.  
Third, we excluded other cases that did not involve an alle-
gation of infringement of a utility patent. This included allega-
tions of legal malpractice, inventorship disputes (including re-
quests for correction of inventorship), demands for patent term 
adjustments, interferences, motions to quash subpoenas, other 
actions against the Patent Office, and mislabeled trademark 
and copyright infringement actions.74 We excluded 139 lawsuits 
on this basis from 2010 and 147 lawsuits from 2012.  
Finally, we excluded duplicate cases. Whenever possible, 
when cases were consolidated or transferred, we eliminated the 
duplicate lawsuit. Although we removed duplicative suits, we 
did not automatically remove declaratory judgment actions. If 
there were reciprocal declaratory judgment and patent in-
fringement actions involving the same parties and the same pa-
tents, we would exclude one of the lawsuits. Unless there was a 
 
current debate about PAEs involves claims about false marking. Consequent-
ly, we thought it best to remove these cases from the data set.  
 72. The America Invents Act eliminated the ability of any member of the 
public to initiate a lawsuit alleging false marking. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2012). 
Instead, only the U.S. government and companies that have been competitive-
ly injured can initiate false marking lawsuits. Id. Almost none of the false 
marking cases brought in 2010 were brought by a company that had been 
competitively injured. 
 73. Design patents are becoming more important in the business context, 
but they still are fundamentally different from utility patents. Design patents 
contain essentially no text; nearly all of the patent specification and claims 
comprise figures of a design. They cover ornamental and decorative aspects of 
a design, as opposed to functional aspects. Litigation involving design patents 
is much cheaper than utility patent litigation. For instance, the American In-
tellectual Property Law Association estimates that the cost of design patent 
litigation is substantially below utility patent litigation. But again, the current 
debate about PAEs is about utility patents, not design patents. 
 74. These cases are quite distinct from patent infringement lawsuits. 
More importantly, they are not part of the debate about PAEs. Thus, we be-
lieve that exclusion of these cases is necessary. 
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reciprocal lawsuit brought by the patent holder, we retained 
declaratory judgment actions in our data set. We understand 
that other researchers have systematically eliminated all de-
claratory judgment actions from their data set.75 We see no rea-
son to exclude declaratory judgment actions, provided that such 
lawsuits involved allegations of utility patent infringement and 
do not result in a double counting of a dispute between the pa-
tentee and the alleged infringer. 
After removing the categories of lawsuits identified above, 
our dataset contained 2,520 patent infringement lawsuits in 
2010 and 5,185 patent infringement lawsuits in 2012. As we 
explain in Part III, the difference is largely explained by the 
AIA change in joinder rules. 
For every lawsuit, we obtained certain specific information 
from Bloomberg Law. We obtained the judicial district in which 
the lawsuit was brought, the judge assigned to the case, the civ-
il action number, the filing date of the lawsuit, the utility pa-
tent numbers asserted in the lawsuit, and a list of all of the 
parties to the lawsuit (including all plaintiffs and defendants). 
From there, we determined the type of patent holder involved 
in the lawsuit. 
C. CLASSIFYING PATENT HOLDERS 
For each of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2010 and 
2012, we classified the patent holder by type of entity. Each of 
the authors coded approximately one third of the cases. We in-
tentionally coded overlapping cases so we could gauge the reli-
ability of the coding. When coding, we considered all of the par-
ties involved in asserting patent infringement. When there was 
only a single party who owned the patent, it was easy. In these 
cases, we focused on the sole patent holder.  
However, when there were two or three plaintiffs (or de-
fendants in declaratory judgment actions), our focus was on 
who controlled the litigation and litigation strategy. This oc-
curred somewhat infrequently. The most common time it oc-
curred was when a patent owned by an Individual was asserted 
in a lawsuit along with an exclusive licensee Operating Com-
pany. In these cases, we identified the patent holder as an Op-
erating Company because the Operating Company was likely 
financing the litigation, taking a large percentage of the win-
 
 75. Jeruss et al., supra note 4, at 365 (“Given our focus on patent holders 
who file infringement cases, we chose to exclude declaratory judgment cases”). 
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nings (if any), and controlling litigation strategy. Even less 
common was a lawsuit involving two plaintiffs, one of which 
was a University patent holder and the other was an exclusive 
licensee Operating Company.76 In this case, we would assume 
that the Operating Company was financing and controlling the 
litigation. Consequently, we classified that sort of case as an 
Operating Company case. Therefore, we believe that our count 
of Individual Inventors and Universities is rather conservative 
because we coded some cases in which these entity types are 
the patent holder as Operating Company cases. 
We classified all patent holders into one and only one of the 
following groups: (1) University; (2) Individual Inventor; (3) 
Large Patent Aggregator; (4) Failed Operating or Start-up 
Company; (5) Patent Holding Company; (6) Operating Compa-
ny; (7) IP Holding Company Owned by Operating Company; 
and (8) Technology Development Company. These categories 
seemed to capture the essential features of the policy debate. 
For instance, we separated Individual Inventors from Patent 
Holding Companies because some argue that a key shortcoming 
of “trolls” is that they do not return sufficient money to the 
original inventor.77 Individual Inventors likely received a sub-
stantial percentage of the proceeds from suits in which they 
were named as the plaintiff; whereas it is less clear that the 
original inventor received a substantial percentage of cases 
brought by Patent Holding Companies.78 
For a small number of companies, we could not determine 
in which group to classify them and therefore labeled them as 
undetermined. If any coder was unsure of the classification of a 
patentee, then the coder would code the classification as “un-
sure” or “undermined.” We then had a second author review the 
coding on these entities.79 Almost no companies remained clas-
sified as undetermined after the second review. 
To determine the proper classification for a plaintiff we 
looked at several sources. First, we reviewed the complaint 
filed in the lawsuit. Sometimes, the complaint mentioned 
whether products were being manufactured by the patent hold-
 
 76. To provide some context on how frequently this arose, we found thir-
teen patent lawsuits filed in 2010 involving University and Operating Compa-
ny co-plaintiffs. Our core results remain unchanged, even if one were to classi-
fy these as University patent holders. 
 77. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2151 n.148.  
 78. See id. 
 79. As an additional layer of reliability, we had student coders verify the 
cases we were unsure of, as well as other cases. 
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er and whether those products were covered by the patents at 
issue. If the complaint made that sort of statement, then we 
coded the patent holder as an Operating Company. It was not 
feasible for us to investigate the quantity of products being 
manufactured or the timing of the manufacture. When the 
complaint was silent (as it was in the majority of cases), we 
used web searches to obtain information about the patent hold-
er. If the patent holder had a website indicating that it manu-
factured products, then we classified it as an Operating Com-
pany.  
Below is a brief description of each category. 
(1) University: A public or private institution of higher 
learning. It includes foreign and domestic institutions.80 An ex-
ample is Cornell University. 
(2) Individual Inventor: One or more inventors who own(s) 
a patent (i.e., it is unassigned to a company). Often the party to 
the litigation would be an individual litigating in their individ-
ual capacity. We also included family trusts in this category. 
Additionally, if it appeared that an individual had formed a 
corporate vehicle that she completely controlled for the primary 
purposes of litigation, then we coded this as an individual, and 
we also created a separate subcategory of individuals litigating 
in a corporate capacity. This arose when the name of the corpo-
rate vehicle included the name of the Individual Inventor and 
no products were being sold. For instance, Ronald A. Katz 
Technology Licensing, L.P. (RAKTL) asserts patents invented 
by Ronald A. Katz.81 While Ronald Katz does not technically 
hold these patents in his individual capacity, we believe that 
RAKTL is best understood as an Individual Inventor. Some-
times our review of corporate records revealed that the Indi-
vidual Inventor owned all of the shares of the corporation. Un-
fortunately, such corporate records were not available for all 
companies, especially for companies we identified as Patent 
Holding Companies. Consequently, we suspect we may under-
count the number of individuals litigating in a corporate capac-
 
 80. We do not believe that any of the entities we categorized as universi-
ties were instead patent holding companies that were named to sound like 
universities. We reviewed the complaints for all cases and the complaints con-
tained recitations of each party in the case. The recitation of universities typi-
cally indicated something along the lines that they were not-for-profit educa-
tional institutions. 
 81. See Company Overview of Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P., 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/ 
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=7672486 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
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ity, and similarly overcount Patent Holding Companies. Final-
ly, we note that one of these coding decisions, in a patent owned 
by an entity named GeoTag, is important to our results, as the 
patent is asserted in numerous litigations, which could skew 
our results.82 
(3) Large Patent Aggregator: A company with a large pa-
tent portfolio whose primary business is enforcing patents of 
numerous other individuals and entities.83 This includes Acacia 
companies84 and Intellectual Ventures.  
(4) Failed Operating or Start-up Company: A company that 
originally invented the patent-in-suit and attempted to com-
 
 82. GeoTag is a company frequently in the news. See, e.g., Peter Bright, 
Google and Microsoft Team Up to Battle Geotagging Patent Troll, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 3, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/ 
2011/03/google-and-microsoft-team-up-to-battle-geotagging-patent-troll/ (stat-
ing that GeoTag sued at least 397 different companies); Ameet Sachdev, 
Obama Tries To Curb Some Patent-Holding Firms, CHI. TRIB. (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0605-patent-trolls-20130605 
-story.html (“Hundreds of retailers, for example, were sued in 2010 by a pa-
tent-holding company called GeoTag Inc. for having websites that used store 
locater functions.”). We coded GeoTag as an Individual Inventor since we un-
derstand that one of the original co-inventors owns 100% of GeoTag. GeoTag is 
a difficult coding decision, as the patent was originally owned by a start-up 
company that employed the inventor. According to a declaratory judgment 
complaint lodged against GeoTag, the patent has changed ownership five 
times, and the original inventor was involved in all of the transfers. Complaint 
at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. GeoTag, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Del. 2011) (No. 
11CV00175), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/ 
delaware/dedce/1:2011cv00175/45847/1/0.pdf?1299179190. We believe that 
this scenario fits more closely to an Individual Inventor. Alternatively, some 
may classify it as a Failed Start-up. It seems, to us, quite different from a pa-
tent holding company which purchases a patent and has no preexisting rela-
tionship with the original inventors. 
 83. The line between Patent Holding Company and Aggregator is not 
completely clean. We generally used the Aggregator category sparingly, limit-
ing it to companies that had assembled via acquisition of portfolios with hun-
dreds of patents or more.  
 84. We identified Acacia companies by several mechanisms. Acacia some-
times litigates in its own name. See Rachael King, Acacia: The Company Tech 
Loves to Hate, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www 
.businessweek.com/stories/2010-02-01/acacia-the-company-tech-loves-to-
hatebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. Other 
times, an Acacia subsidiary or other company with an agreement with Acacia 
is the patent holder and does not contain “Acacia” in its corporate name. See 
id. We located what we believe are most of these companies by analyzing Aca-
cia press releases of settlements, which identified the Acacia company. Fur-
thermore, we checked the corporate ownership information for most of the pa-
tent holders. Acacia’s name often was visible in a corporate ownership check. 
If the company was an Acacia company, we coded it as a Large Aggregator, 
regardless of the underlying company’s entity type. 
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mercialize the technology. At present, the company sells no 
products and its primary business appears to be patent litiga-
tion. An example of the Failed Operating or Start-up Company 
is Broadband Graphics LLC.  
(5) Patent Holding Company: Companies, usually limited 
liability companies, that appear to have been formed solely to 
hold and enforce a patent or small portfolio of patents. As far as 
we can tell, these companies are not owned by the original in-
ventor. Frequently, these companies were formed shortly before 
litigation was commenced. 
(6) Operating Company: Companies that manufacture 
products or deliver services (other than licensing patents). An 
example of an Operating Company is Hewlett Packard. We 
have not analyzed whether the Operating Company is making 
use of the patent-in-suit.85 
(7) IP Holding Company Owned by Operating Company: 
Companies that were wholly-owned by Operating Companies. 
For instance, AT&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. is an IP Hold-
ing Company for AT&T Inc. 
(8) Technology Development Company: A company which 
invested in the development of technology, perhaps with the in-
tention of licensing rather than commercialization. A Technolo-
gy Development Company is the original owner of the patents 
but does not manufacture products covered by the patents. Ex-
amples of Technology Development companies are Walker Digi-
tal LLC and Tessera Technologies.  
As previously mentioned, we coded a subset of each other’s 
coding. From a mathematical calculation, the reliability of our 
coding appears quite high.86 That said, one should be aware 
 
 85. We know that some operating companies assert patents that they do 
not utilize in their business operations. See Ted M. Sichelman, The Vonage 
Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1856703. 
 86. We chose Cohen’s kappa as the measure of inter-coder agreement. See 
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 113–14 (2008) (stating that the best practice 
for relaying reliability information is to report a coefficient such as “Cohen’s 
kappa”). Cohen’s kappa ranges from 0 to 1, with numbers near 1 indicating a 
higher degree of reliability. Id. For our 2010 unique parties, Cohen’s kappa is 
0.653, which equates to “[s]ubstantial agreement.” Anthony J. Viera & Joanne 
M. Garrett, Understanding Interobserver Agreement: The Kappa Statistic, 37 
FAM. MED. 360, 362 (2005). For our 2012 unique parties, Cohen’s kappa is 
0.836, which equates to “[a]lmost perfect agreement.” Id. By calculating 
kappas on unique parties instead of all parties, we likely overstate the amount 
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that our coding is based upon publicly available information. It 
is quite possible that some of the companies have confidential 
transactions relating to the patents that would affect our cod-
ing. For instance, some of the Patent Holding Companies may 
be affiliated with the original inventor, although we cannot tell 
that from the available public information. Furthermore, it is 
often difficult to identify Failed Start-ups.  
D. OTHER DATA 
We counted the number of accused infringers in each law-
suit. We hand counted the defendants after an earlier version 
of this article used an estimation procedure.87 To hand count, 
we pulled the complaint, and any amended complaints, for each 
coded lawsuit and counted the number of defendants listed. We 
included in the defendant count any party identified by the 
plaintiff(s) as a defendant in the complaint.88 For declaratory 
judgment cases, we counted plaintiffs as “defendants,” and if 
Does were listed as defendants, we counted them as a single 
“defendant” regardless of the number of individual Does identi-
fied. A defendant was still counted as a “defendant” even if they 
were dismissed from a lawsuit. However, if a party became a 
defendant in a suit via consolidation from another suit, we did 
not count them as a “defendant” to prevent double-counting. 
We did all of this to ensure accuracy in our defendant count 
numbers. Although we report the information relying upon the 
 
of disagreement in our respective coding. For instance, the kappa for 2012 du-
plicate parties is .956, indicating that we almost always agree on the patent 
holders who appear multiple times in the dataset. We did not code an overlap-
ping set of duplicate parties in 2010 so we cannot report a similar kappa. The 
difference between the 2010 and 2012 kappas likely reflects an incremental 
improvement in our coding methodology which we refined as we went along, 
and the numbers do not likely reflect any underlying issue related to the par-
ties or that there is significant subjectivity in our individual coding approach-
es.  
 87. In an earlier draft of this article, we estimated the number of defend-
ants from the raw information provided by Bloomberg Law. More specifically, 
we counted the number of parties to the lawsuit, as identified by Bloomberg 
Law, and subtracted one to attempt to remove the plaintiff from the total. Af-
ter we received feedback from Professor Robin Feldman that our estimated 
number appeared too low, we hand counted the number of defendants for each 
utility patent infringement suit.  
 88. Unfortunately, it was unfeasible for us to exclude “related” defend-
ants. Thus, if two distinct yet apparently related corporate entities (i.e., LG 
Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics USA Inc.) appeared as separate defend-
ants, we counted those as two defendants. In follow-on research, we are man-
ually identifying such related parties to permit them to be removed, when ap-
propriate. 
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hand counted numbers below, the differences between the hand 
counts and estimated counts have no material effect on the 
main findings of the Article.89 More specifically, the joinder rule 
changes appear to be responsible for nearly all of the change in 
patent litigation defendants between 2010 and 2012. 
Docket Navigator also graciously provided us data about 
claim construction, the process of determining the scope of pa-
tent protection accorded to a patent claim.90 More specifically, 
Docket Navigator told us which patent lawsuits in 2010 had re-
sulted in a claim construction and which had not. The data cap-
tured whether the claims had been construed and which claims 
were construed during summary judgment motions, in a sepa-
rate claim construction hearing or proceeding, or at another 
time during the litigation. We tested a random sample of 2% of 
the data provided by Docket Navigator and found the data to be 
highly reliable.91 
Finally, we obtained a list of the patent numbers asserted 
in each case in 2010. We recorded the information that Bloom-
berg Law generated for each case. It appears that Bloomberg 
Law used an automated means to scrape the complaints and 
capture the patent numbers affiliated with each case. After re-
 
 89. The hand count resulted in a total of 9,894 and 9,419 defendants in 
2010 and 2012, respectively. Our original estimation was 11,671 defendants in 
2010 and 11,603 defendants in 2012. There are several reasons for the differ-
ence. First, some cases had multiple plaintiffs. Second, some parties that ap-
pear as “parties” in Bloomberg Law’s data are not defendants. For instance, 
Bloomberg Law identifies special masters or members of the media seeking 
access to documents as parties. Finally, Bloomberg Law had an occasional er-
ror when cases were consolidated. The original lawsuits with the correct num-
ber of defendants were present in most of the cases. However, in one case, 
Bloomberg Law provided a list of all of the defendants. This resulted in double 
counting using the original method. Our hand counting method properly rec-
ognized that these consolidated defendants were not part of the complaint in 
the case, and consequently these defendants were excluded.  
 90. See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the 
Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033–34 
(2007) (discussing how courts interpret patent claims).  
 91. More specifically, we randomly selected 50 cases from 2010. For those 
cases, we studied the docket report for the litigation, reviewing all relevant 
documents, to determine if the claims had been construed. We then compared 
our results with the data provided by Docket Navigator on claim construction. 
For 49 of the 50 cases, we agreed with Docket Navigator. In one case, we iden-
tified claim constructions that were not reported by Docket Navigator. Upon 
investigation, Docket Navigator informed us that the order construing claims 
was not immediately available from PACER when filed, so Docket Navigator 
was unable to record the construed terms when it initially processed the doc-
ument. Docket Navigator was able to obtain the document at a later date and 
back-fill the missing claim constructions. 
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viewing the Bloomberg Law patent number information, we 
had concerns about its accuracy.92 We attempted to manually 
correct the Bloomberg Law results when they appeared likely 
to be inaccurate. Because we used the patent numbers merely 
to roughly categorize by technology, we believe that the inaccu-
racies may be less important.93  
III.  RESULTS   
As previously discussed, we initially collected 3,553 cases 
filed in 2010 and 5,600 cases filed in 2012 identified as “830—
Patent” cases in PACER, through Bloomberg Law.94 We manu-
ally removed false marking cases; cases involving only design 
patents; cases that did not include an allegation of patent in-
fringement; and “duplicate” filings, such as corresponding de-
claratory judgment actions to already filed infringement ac-
tions and consolidations of already filed cases. This left 2,520 
utility patent infringement cases filed in 2010 and 5,185 filed 
in 2012. These constituted the universe of cases that we ana-
lyzed further. 
The distribution of the raw number of utility patent in-
fringement cases filed by each patentee category is set forth be-
low in Figure 1 for 2010 and 2012.95  
 
 
 92. We reviewed a random sample of Bloomberg Law’s coding and found 
10–20% of the cases had errors in the patent numbers. The errors appeared 
especially likely in declaratory judgment complaints in which the plaintiff al-
leged inequitable conduct. These allegations often mentioned patent numbers 
of allegedly undisclosed prior art, and Bloomberg Law mistakenly included 
these patent numbers as being asserted in the case. 
 93. Take, for example, a case with detailed allegations of inequitable con-
duct including a recitation of patents that allegedly were withheld from the 
Patent Office. In this case, Bloomberg Law’s automated manner of identifying 
the litigated patents would wrongly determine that the patents in the inequi-
table conduct allegations were patents-in-suit. However, it is likely that all of 
the patents in the inequitable conduct allegation are in the same technological 
field as the actual patents-in-suit, as they must be “material” in order to com-
plete the allegation for inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Bec-
ton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Since we only used 
patents at the level of technological field, these errors would not affect our 
analysis. 
 94. See supra Part II.B. 
 95. There were only four patentees we could not categorize, all in the pa-
tent lawsuits filed in 2010. These patentees included Conectflex Technologies 
LLC, Locked and Loaded Products, Inc., Noah Systems, Inc., and One-to-One 
Integrated Technologies. 
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FIGURE 1: Cases Filed by Patent Holder Category, 
2010 and 2012 
 
 
 
The total number of utility patent infringement cases in-
creased from 2010 to 2012 from 2,520 to 5,185 cases.96 The 
number of cases for each category of patentee, except IP Hold-
ing Companies, increased from 2010 to 2012. The greatest in-
crease occurred in the Patent Holding Company category, with 
the number of cases rising from 400 to 1,946. The number of 
 
 96. The difference in the distribution between 2010 and 2012 is statisti-
cally significant, with a Pearson’s chi-squared test reporting 591.2737 and a p-
value < 0.0001. 
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lawsuits filed by Individual Inventors increased, but, interest-
ingly, the percentage of those cases filed by a true individual 
(as opposed to a corporate entity formed and owned by the In-
dividual Inventor) dropped substantially. More specifically, 
true Individual Inventors brought 68.4% of the Individual In-
ventor cases in 2010, but only 39.3% of the Individual Inventor 
cases in 2012.97 The number of cases filed by Operating Com-
panies increased from 1,748 cases to 2,202 cases. Operating 
Companies still made up the largest percentage of cases filed in 
both 2010 and 2012. In terms of percentages, Operating Com-
panies patent holders made up a little under 50% of patent in-
fringement lawsuits in 2012. 
These numbers are insightful for studying the behavior of 
different types of patent holders, but the change in the number 
of filings could have been driven, at least in part, by the AIA’s 
change to the joinder rules.98 To test whether the increase in 
the number of cases filed is driven, at least in part, by the new 
joinder rules, the data collected was examined to determine the 
number of unique patentees that filed suit for each year—2010 
and 2012.99 For 2010, we observed 1588 unique patentees. For 
2012, there were 1667 unique patentees that filed suit. 
Figure 2 sets forth the numbers and percentages of unique 
patentees that filed for each patentee category in 2010 and 
2012. 
 
 
 97. True individuals brought 132 of 193 cases in 2010 and 155 of 394 cas-
es in 2012. If GeoTag is excluded, then true individuals brought 132 of 184 
cases in 2010 (71.7%) and 157 of 299 cases in 2012 (52.5%), still a substantial 
drop. 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012); Crouch, supra note 55. 
 99. We recognize that the joinder rules may have decreased the total 
number of patent lawsuits because they required an additional filing fee for 
each company selling a separate allegedly infringing product. According to this 
theory, the cases should have decreased between 2010 and 2012, and if the da-
ta indicates a constant number of cases, then that may represent an increase. 
In the future, we plan to investigate whether the total number of patents as-
serted have changed and also study how many patentees filed lawsuits in di-
verse district involving the same patent. We note, however, that the district 
courts used a variety of approaches to reduce their workload when confronted 
with separate lawsuits relating to the same patent. These included the use of 
multi-district litigation (MDL) and consolidation of matters for pre-trial pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., In re: Bear Creek Tech., Inc., (‘722) Patent Litig., 858 
F.Supp.2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (centralizing 14 patent infringement actions 
involving the same telecommunications patent). Consolidation and MDL made 
the separate cases proceed similar to a single case naming multiple defend-
ants. Thus, there may not have been a substantial increase in patent-side liti-
gation costs caused by the joinder provision. 
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FIGURE 2: Number of Unique Patentees, 2010 and 
2012 
 
 
The total number of unique patentees for each year stud-
ied, 2010 and 2012, was very similar (1,588 compared to 1,667 
patentees). The similarity in terms of number of unique patent-
ees is in sharp contrast to the data on the raw number of fil-
ings, which showed a large increase in litigation. And, as can be 
seen above in Figure 2, the distribution among the various pa-
tentee types is nearly identical for each year.100 Thus, while 
there was nearly double the number of lawsuits filed in 2012 
than 2010, the number of patent holders involved in the patent 
litigation system seemed essentially unchanged. Importantly, 
the number of Patent Holding Companies, the category of pa-
tent holder that had the largest increase in the number of raw 
 
 100. The difference in the distribution of types of patents between 2010 
and 2012 is not statistically significant, with a Pearson’s chi-squared test re-
porting 4.2256 and a p-value of 0.753. 
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filings, had a much smaller increase when measured by unique 
patentees.  
However, these figures only account for the number of 
unique patentees. Another, perhaps more important, perspec-
tive on the data is the number of defendants being sued by pa-
tentees in the various categories. As noted above, we hand 
counted the number of defendants in each case using the com-
plaint, and any amended complaints, filed.101 Using this data, 
we calculated the number of parties for each patentee catego-
ry.102 
Figure 3 sets forth the total number of defendants for each 
patentee category in 2010 and 2012. 
 
 
 101. Every listed defendant in a given case is counted as a “defendant” for 
the purposes of this analysis. The only exceptions are (a) those defendants 
that are added to a case via consolidation (these are excluded to prevent dou-
ble-counting) and (b) multiple “Does” (which are counted as a singular defend-
ant regardless of how many does are listed). Even if a defendant is dismissed 
from a suit, they are still counted as a “defendant.” 
 102. We acknowledge that this method treats all assertions by the same 
patentee together, even if the assertions involved different patents. When we 
obtain all of the patent numbers, we will investigate if this matters. We also 
recognize that related companies are identified as separate defendants. In 
other words, if Sony North America, Inc. and Sony Japan were separately sued 
in a single case, they are counted as two defendants. In reality, they may be 
represented by the same attorney and raise the same litigation arguments. It 
was not feasible for us to manually adjust the count of defendants to collapse 
these related defendants. We will investigate in a future paper whether col-
lapsing related defendants matters. 
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FIGURE 3: Total Number of Defendants by Type of 
Patentee, 2010 and 2012103 
 
 
 
The number of defendants stayed relatively constant be-
tween 2010 and 2012 for most patentee categories. The total 
number of defendants was 9,894 in 2010 and 9,419 in 2012. 
Specifically relevant to the PAE debate, the number of Patent 
Holding Companies increased from 2,907 to 3,097—a relatively 
small change. The two notable changes, although not dramatic, 
were in the number of defendants in Individual Inventor and 
Large Aggregator patentee cases.104 The number of parties in 
Individual Inventor cases decreased from 1,134 in 2010 to 705 
in 2012. And the number of parties increased for Large Aggre-
gators from 453 in 2010 to 619 in 2012.  
 
 103. As discussed in a previous draft of this article, we used Bloomberg’s 
total number of parties as the basis for computing the number of defendants. 
We ultimately counted all defendants ourselves. Notably, while the absolute 
numbers changed, the relationships between the two years for each category 
do not vary much, at all, between hand counting defendants and using Bloom-
berg’s total number of parties metric. 
 104. A Pearson’s chi-squared test reported a 292.8967 and a p-value 
< 0.0001.  
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One benefit of our granular data is that it can be used to 
construct counts of PAEs based upon various definitions of 
PAEs. In other words, depending upon one’s view of which enti-
ties are properly labeled PAEs, one can construct relevant sta-
tistics. Some believe that PAEs are all non-operating compa-
nies including Individual Inventors, Failed Start-ups, 
Universities, Technology Development Companies, along with 
Patent Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators. Using such 
a broad definition, the percentage of unique patentees in-
creased from 2010 to 2012 by 2.7 percentage points (28.5% in 
2010; 31.1% in 2012) and the percentage of defendants sued by 
PAEs increased from 2010 to 2012 by 1.6 percentage points 
(53.3% in 2010; 54.9% in 2012). For those who exclude Individ-
ual Inventors from their definition of PAEs, the percentage of 
unique patentees increased by 2.0 percentage points (19.5% in 
2010; 21.5% in 2012) and 5.6 percentage points for the percent-
age of defendants (41.8% in 2010; 47.4% in 2012). For those 
who include only non-original owners as PAEs—only Patent 
Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators—the percentage of 
unique patentees increased from 2010 to 2012 by 1.8 percent-
age points (14.9% in 2010; 16.7% in 2012) and the percentage of 
defendants accounted for by these PAEs increased 5.4 percent-
age points (34.1% in 2010; 39.5% in 2012). All of these changes 
are well below the magnitude set forth in the Executive Office 
Report,105 but the actual differences depend upon the precise 
definition of PAE used. Because the Executive Office Report re-
lied upon proprietary industry data, we cannot directly com-
pare the coding. 
The number of defendants for 2010 can also be separately 
analyzed by the technology at issue. Table I below illustrates 
that the patent cases are dispersed across all technology fields, 
but that Computers and Communications has substantially 
more cases than the other technology fields. It has nearly dou-
ble the number of cases and over triple the number of parties 
than the other technology fields. 
 
 
 105. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:19 PM 
680 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:649 
 
TABLE I: Distribution of Patent Litigation by Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Technolo-
gy Class, 2010 
 
NBER Technology # of 
Cas-
es
# of Defendants 
1. Chemical (excluding Drugs) 162 333
2. Computers and Communica-
tions 
864 5,456
3. Drugs and Medical 465 1,198
4. Electrical and Electronics 253 1,055
5. Mechanical 287 662
6. Others 484 1,167
  
We do not presently have the patent numbers affiliated 
with the 2012 lawsuits; consequently, we cannot provide analo-
gous information about 2012. To understand better the Com-
puters and Communications National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER) category in 2010, in Tables II and III below we 
provide further information about that category as well as the 
Drugs and Medical NBER category. We note stark differences 
in the distribution of Individual Inventor and Patent Holding 
Companies in the Computer and Communication and Drug and 
Medical technology categories. 
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FIGURE 4: Distribution of Patent Cases by Technol-
ogy 
 
SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:19 PM 
682 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:649 
 
FIGURE 5: Distribution of Number of Defendants by 
Technology 
 
 
Notably, for 2010, the number of cases (864) and number of 
defendants (5,456) in cases involving Computers and Commu-
nications was almost double the comparable numbers for the 
next closest categories—Drugs and Medical (465 cases with 
1,198 defendants) and Other (484 cases with 1,167 defendants). 
For cases involving Computers and Communications, the high-
est number of cases was brought by Operating Companies (408 
cases) and the highest number of defendants involved in patent 
lawsuits was brought by plaintiffs who were Patent Holding 
Companies (2,217 parties). Thus, in the Computers and Com-
munications industry, most defendants were sued by non-
Operating Companies. Operating Companies dominated cases 
involving Drugs and Medicine, with 417 cases brought compris-
ing 885 parties, excluding the patentee.  
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS   
A. EXPLORING THE LACK OF MATERIAL CHANGE BETWEEN 2010 
AND 2012 
Based on our data, there is no major difference between 
both the number of unique patentees and the number of alleged 
infringers from 2010 to 2012. Although the number of cases in-
creased, the totals for the main players—patentees and defend-
ants—stayed essentially constant. One way to consider this is 
that the AIA has added substantial cost to the system, by in-
creasing the number of lawsuits, without decreasing the num-
ber of patentees or defendants.106 This observation is confirmed 
by a two-sample T test with unequal variances reporting a sta-
tistically significant variation in the distribution of the number 
of parties excluding patentees for Individual Inventor,107 Patent 
Holding Company,108 and Large Aggregator Patentee cases be-
tween 2010 and 2012.109  
The question, then, is how the distribution is different 
within the various patentee categories. What are the changes 
in behavior at a more granular level? In other words, what are 
the changes between 2010 and 2012 that are not evident from 
merely looking at the aggregate numbers of plaintiffs, defend-
ants, and lawsuits? To explore this question further, we looked 
at the number of patentees in a given category that make up 
the four quartiles of the number of parties for each unique pa-
tentee110 in a given year. We ordered the defendants, beginning 
with the unique patentees who sued the most parties. We then 
divided the number of defendants in four equal groups, which 
we label as quartiles. Figure 6 below shows the breakdown of 
defendants by unique patentee.  
 
 
 106. These costs may not be that significant when one considers how the 
courts have handled multiple lawsuits involving the same patent post-AIA. 
Many districts try to hold costs down by consolidating cases for specific pur-
poses such as claim construction and discovery. And multidistrict litigation is 
also being used when the cases are dispersed across courts in multiple venues. 
But, of course, there is no consolidation of trials.  
 107. T of 10.2173 with a p-value < 0.0001 for patent holding company cas-
es. 
 108. T of 4.8446 with a p-value < 0.0001 for individual cases. 
 109. T of 4.7586 with a p-value < 0.0001 for large aggregator cases. 
 110. By unique patentee, we simply mean a particular patentee without 
double counting. 
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FIGURE 6: Distribution of Defendants by Unique Pa-
tentee, 2010 and 2012 
 
 
 
As shown above in Figure 6, suits initiated by a small 
number of unique patentees constitute a majority of the alleged 
infringers for a given year. Thus, a very few patent holders are 
responsible for a great number of patent lawsuits. For 2010, 26 
patentees were responsible for the top quartile of parties, while 
35 patentees were responsible for the top quartile in 2012. And 
this distribution by the number of patentees making up each 
quartile is very similar for both 2010 and 2012 (92 to 105 pa-
tentees for the second quartile, 262 to 282 for the third quar-
tile, and 1,212 to 1,245 patentees for the bottom quartile). The-
se results are not surprising. A small group of aggressive 
patentees were targeting the most alleged infringers while 
about 75% of the patentees fall into the last quartile, most of 
whom simply sue only one alleged infringer. Consequently, 
most patent holders are not significant in terms of the rate of 
overall patent litigation. 
To understand how the categories of patentees relate to the 
distribution, set forth below is this quartile information, show-
ing the number of parties, divided into quartiles, involved for 
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each patentee category. This information is presented for both 
2010 and 2012 in Figures 7 and 8 below.  
 
FIGURE 7: Quartiles by Number Defendants per 
Unique Patentee, 2010 
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FIGURE 8: Quartiles by Number of Defendants per 
Unique Patentee, 2012 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, there are some differ-
ences in distribution between the two years worth noting. The 
number of accused infringers in each quartile did differ, partic-
ularly for the first and second quartiles. In 2010, the top quar-
tile included unique patentees alleging infringement against 
between 52 and 422 accused infringers. In 2012, the top quar-
tile included unique patentees alleging infringement against 
fewer accused infringers (between 37 and 134). The second 
quartile ranged from 17 to 51 in 2010, and 15 to 36 in 2012. 
The third quartile included from 6 to 17 in 2010, and 5 to 15 in 
2012. The bottom quartile ranged from 1 to 6 in 2010, and 1 to 
5 in 2012. 
The other difference is the distribution for Individu-
al/Family Trust patentees and Large Aggregators between the 
two years. In 2010, mainly due to the activity of one patentee, 
GeoTag, Individual/Family Trust patentees made up a much 
greater percentage of the top quartile as compared to 2012. Pa-
tent Aggregators also grew in the top quartile from 2010 until 
2012. The presence of a major IP Holding Company of an Oper-
ating Company, U.S. Ethernet Innovations LLC, in the top 
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quartile in 2010 also created a difference in distribution for the 
top tier between the two years. 
Accordingly, only about 25% of the unique patentees al-
leged infringement against 75% of the defendants for each year. 
And the only material changes between the make-up of the 
quartiles between the two years is the number of defendants 
per patentee for the upper quartiles. In 2010, fewer unique pa-
tentees sued the first quartile (25%) of the defendants than in 
2012. This may have been because it was cheaper to sue nu-
merous defendants in 2010—because the defendants could be 
sued in a single lawsuit—than in 2012, after the AIA joinder 
rules went into effect. However, it is difficult to fully analyze 
these differences with only two years of data. In the Appendix, 
we provide further analysis of the distribution of different types 
of patentees in 2010 and 2012. 
The data can also be analyzed focusing on the small num-
ber of patentees that are suing large swathes of alleged infring-
ers. To see if this is the case, we calculated the top ten patent-
ees, by number of parties involved in the lawsuits, for each of 
the observed years. These “top ten” lists are set forth below.  
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FIGURE 9: Top Ten Most Litigious Patent Holders, 2010  
 
 Uniloc USA Inc. provides a good example of how our cod-
ing may differ from others.  Some people anecdotally refer to 
Uniloc as a “troll.”111 When we performed our original coding 
(summer 2013), our investigation indicated that Uniloc sells 
products that are related to their patents. More specifically, a 
Google search for Uniloc USA Inc. returned a link for 
http://www.uniloc.com.  That website included a link to 
“NetAuthority.” When that link was activated, the user was re-
directed to the website for http://netauthority.com, and prod-
ucts related to the patents in suit were clearly being sold by 
 
 111. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, You Can’t Patent Simple Math, Judge Tells Pa-
tent Troll Uniloc, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech 
-policy/2013/03/you-cant-patent-simple-math-judge-tells-patent-troll-uniloc. 
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Uniloc USA Inc.  We used the Wayback Machine to confirm 
that Uniloc, through NetAuthority, was selling products back 
in 2010.112 Accordingly, Uniloc USA Inc. was coded as an Oper-
ating Company.113  
ArrivalStar is another company that was somewhat difficult 
to classify. ArrivalStar does not appear to be the original owner 
of the patents in suit. However, the original inventor appears to 
have some affiliation with the company.114 We limited the Indi-
vidual Inventor category to true individuals and to corporate 
entities which were controlled entirely by the original, individ-
ual inventor. We did not feel that there was sufficiently clear 
information to classify ArrivalStar as an Individual Inventor 
company, and instead classified it as a Patent Holding Compa-
ny. 
  Finally, although some have called Realtime Data LLC 
d/b/a IXO an “NPE,”115 we classified it as an Operating Compa-
ny. Its website (http://ixorealtime.com/About_Us.html) and the 
complaints in the lawsuits indicate that it makes products.116 
Furthermore, Business Week notes it was founded in 1998 and 
sells software.117 We note that several of the most litigious pa-
tent holders were close calls on categorization. We believe that 
these entities were some of the more difficult to classify. Our 
 
 112. See WAYBACK MACHINE, https://web.archive.org/web/20100105213003/ 
http://uniloc.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 113. During the editing process for this article (fall 2014), the Uniloc web-
site no longer contained a link to NetAuthority, and the NetAuthority website 
was also defunct. This is largely not relevant to our coding since we strive to 
identify whether Uniloc sold products in 2010, when it brought the lawsuits. 
Separately, a patent litigator who represented a defendant charged with in-
fringement by Uniloc told us that he had been unable to obtain any commer-
cial products made by Uniloc in discovery. Investigation into such statements 
is beyond the scope of this Article. We believe that Uniloc is a close call on 
whether it is an Operating Company, a Failed Start-up, or Patent Holding 
Company. 
 114. See Tom De Poto, New Jersey Firm Stands Up to Patent Trolls, 
NJ.COM (Sept. 6, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2013/ 
09/jersey_firm_stands_up_to_paten.html. 
 115. Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent 
Law: Moving Toward Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 844 (2012). 
 116. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement ¶ 1, 
Realtime Data, LLC v. Thompson Reuters, 897 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 11-cv-06703), 2011 WL 4576896. 
 117. Company Overview of Realtime Data LLC, BUSINESS WEEK, 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privca
pId=142803119 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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discussion here of these entities should not be read to imply 
that all of the classifications involved similar difficulties. 
  
FIGURE 10: Top Ten Most Litigious Patent Holders, 2012 
 
  In a prior draft of this article, we discussed the coding of 
Brandywine Communications Technologies LLC. After report-
ing that Brandywine appeared to be a subsidiary of Acacia,118 
we noted that Brandywine’s website indicated that it sold 
products.119 Based upon this information, we believed that 
Brandywine was best categorized as an Operating Company. 
We have investigated further, and now believe that Bran-
dywine is best categorized as an Aggregator due to its relation-
ship with Acacia. Our further investigation included a phone 
call to the number listed on Brandywine’s website. Representa-
tives for the company indicated that it was unaffiliated with 
 
 118. See Acacia Subsidiary Enters into License and Settlement Agreement 
with Mitel Networks Corporation, DAILY FIN. (May 17, 2013, 6:22 AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/05/17/acacia-subsidiary-enters-into-license-
and-settleme. 
 119. See BRANDYWINE COMM., http://www.brandywinecomm.com (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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the patent holder in the lawsuits. Accordingly, we revised our 
classification of this entity. 
 We also revised the coding of another “Top Ten” patent 
holder, Blue Spike LLC. Originally, we coded Blue Spike as an 
Operating Company because Blue Spike’s website (http://blue-
spike.myshopify.com/collections/frontpage) indicates that it 
sells products, and Blue Spike recently applied for a federal 
trademark on its products, indicating under oath that it was 
using the mark in commerce.120 We noted that the coding was a 
close call because Blue Spike’s website also prominently men-
tions its patents and the company has an office in Tyler, Texas, 
which may have been formed to establish closer ties to the 
Eastern District of Texas. Upon further investigation, including 
discussions with an attorney who represented the company, we 
understand that Blue Spike does not currently sell products. It 
appears that the individual inventor who formed Blue Spike 
and serves as its President and CEO was involved in the early 
development of the technology-at-issue, digital watermarking. 
Because the company failed in the marketplace, we coded it as 
a Failed Operating Company/Start-up. 
Coding issues aside, a couple of observations are relevant. 
For 2010, the top ten patentees accounted for 1,396 (14.11%) of 
the total parties involved in patent infringement suits, while in 
2012, the top ten accounted for 1,061 (11.26%) of the total par-
ties involved. In 2010, one patentee, GeoTag, dominated the top 
ten list, whereas the distribution in 2012 was more even. Nota-
bly, two patentees make both lists—GeoTag and ArrivalStar 
S.A.. And these top ten lists are made up of a smattering of pa-
tentees from numerous patentee categories. Interestingly, three 
large Aggregators, Unified Messaging Solutions LLC, Bran-
dywine Communications Technologies LLC, and Digitech Im-
age Technologies LLC—all affiliated with Acacia Technolo-
gies—made the list in 2012. 
Therefore, based on the data we gathered, things have not 
changed much from 2010 to 2012. While more lawsuits were 
filed, the number of unique patentees and defendants remained 
constant, and the distribution of these numbers among patent-
ee categories stayed roughly the same as well. Furthermore, 
most patent litigation, that involving at least 75% of the pa-
tentees, has remained nearly the same between these two 
years. 
 
 120. TRADEMARKS411, http://trademarks411.com/marks/86096173-blue 
-spike (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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B. COMPARING OUR DATA TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Our results can also be compared to previous studies re-
garding litigation characteristics of different type of patentees. 
Two specific studies that we looked at are those by Feldman et 
al.121 and RPX Corporation.122 A summary of the comparison of 
the data between the studies and ours is set forth below in Ta-
ble II. 
 
Table II: Comparison of Descriptive Findings from  
Various Studies 
 
Type of Pa-
tentee-
Plaintiff in 
Various Stud-
ies 
% 
Cases 
Filed 
in 
2010 
by 
PAEs
% Cas-
es Filed 
in 2012 
by 
PAEs 
% Par-
ties/Allege
d Infring-
ers In-
volved in 
PAE suits 
in 2010
% Par-
ties/Alleged 
Infringers 
Involved in 
PAE suits in 
2012 
Feldman et 
al.123 
N/A124 58.7% 
(2,750 
cases)
N/A125 49.90% 
(4,606 de-
fendants) 
Feldman et al. 
(Individual In-
ventors) 
N/A 4.1% 
(206 
cases)126
N/A 6.27% (579 
defendants) 
Feldman et al. 
(Failed Start-
ups only) 
N/A127 N/A N/A N/A
 
 
 
 
 
 121. Feldman et al., supra note 52. 
 122. RPX CORP., supra note 15. 
 123. The data in this table from Feldman et al. focuses on what they coded 
as a “patent monetization entity” or “monetizer,” which, based on their article, 
excludes “Individual or Trust” and “University.” Feldman et al., supra note 52, 
at 16, 24–26. 
 124. Feldman et al. did not report data from 2010. See id. at 15. 
 125. Again, Feldman et al. did not report 2010 data. See id. 
 126. While RPX does not disaggregate its data, it reported that “94% of 
2012 suits brought by entities that do not practice were brought by corporate 
PAEs.” Chien, supra note 3. We suspect that RPX may be classifying individu-
al inventors who form a wholly-owned corporate vehicle to enforce their pa-
tents as “corporate PAEs.”  
 127. Feldman et al. did not classify Failed Start-ups or Failed Operating 
Companies separately. See Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 40. 
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Feldman et al. 
(Technology 
Development 
Cos. only) 
N/A128 N/A N/A N/A
RPX129 30% 
(765 
cases)
65% 
(3,054 
cases)
55% 
(4,170 de-
fendants)
61% (4,351 
defendants) 
RPX (Failed 
start-ups only) 
N/A130 N/A N/A N/A
RPX (Tech-
nology Devel-
opment Com-
panies) 
N/A131 N/A N/A N/A
Cotropia, 
Kesan, 
Schwartz132 
(Large Aggre-
gators + Patent 
Holding Com-
panies) 
17.80
%133 
(448 
cases) 
43.93% 
(2,278 
cases) 
34.06% 
(3,370 de-
fendants) 
39.45% 
(3,716 de-
fendants) 
Cotropia, 
Kesan, 
Schwartz134 
(Large Aggre-
gators + Patent 
Holding Com-
panies + Indi-
viduals) 
25.48
% 
(641 
cases) 
51.53% 
(2,672 
cases) 
45.52% 
(4,504 de-
fendants) 
46.94% 
(4,421 de-
fendants) 
 
 128. Feldman et al. did not classify Technology Development Companies 
separately. Cf. id. at 18–27 (discussing the study design and company classifi-
cations). 
 129. RPX’s data represented in this table identified “non-practicing enti-
ties” or “NPEs.” RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 3. 
 130. RPX did not report data on Failed Start-ups or Failed Operating 
Companies separately. Cf. id. at 7–8 (discussing the study’s methodology and 
definitions). 
 131. RPX did not report data on Technology Development Companies sepa-
rately. Cf. id. 
 132. Our data in this column combines patentees in the Large Aggregator 
and Patent Holding Company categories. 
 133. Ideally, we would report the same number of significant digits for each 
study. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the raw data for the other stud-
ies, and consequently report it here exactly as it is available to us. 
 134. Our data in this row combines patentees in the Large Aggregator, Pa-
tent Holding Company, and Individuals categories. 
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Cotropia, 
Kesan, 
Schwartz 
(Failed Operat-
ing Compa-
nies/Failed 
Start-ups) 
1.9% 
(48) 
6.4% 
(382) 
4% (400) 4% (380) 
Cotropia, 
Kesan, 
Schwartz 
(Technology 
Development 
Companies) 
1.4% 
(34) 
1.7% 
(87) 
1% (95) 2.4% (229) 
Cotropia, 
Kesan, 
Schwartz (in-
dividual/family 
trust) 
7.7% 
(193) 
7.6% 
(394) 
11.5% 
(1135) 
7.5% (705) 
 
As detailed below, there are differences, and these differ-
ences are driven, at least in part, by the patentee categories 
used in the various studies and the level of detail used when 
reporting the data. 
1. Cases Filed 
Regarding the distribution of cases among the various cat-
egories, Feldman et al. found, in the one year overlapping with 
our study, that 58.7% of the patentees were “Monetizers” in 
2012.135 And RPX found that “Non-Practicing Entities” (“NPEs”) 
filed 3,054 cases in 2012 (65% of all patent infringement cases) 
and 765 cases in 2010 (30% of all patent infringement cases).136 
In comparison, adding our Large Aggregator and Patent 
Holding Company category results together to facilitate a prop-
er comparison, our findings show these two categories compris-
ing 448 cases (17.80%) in 2010 and 2,278 cases (43.93%) in 
2012. If the Individual/Family Trust results are added to Large 
Aggregator and Patent Holding Company results, the findings 
 
 135. Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 37 (“Most significantly, monetizers 
crossed into the majority in 2012, having filed 58.7% of patent infringement 
lawsuits.”). We do not compare to Professor Chien’s data as she relies upon 
RPX data for her studies.  
 136. RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 11 (Chart 4). 
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show 641 cases (25.48%) in 2010 and 2,672 cases (51.53%) in 
2012. 
Accordingly, even if Individual/Family Trust cases are 
added to categories that more closely fit the other studies’ defi-
nitions of Monetizers and PAEs, our data reports significantly 
lower percentages as compared to those of Feldman et al. and 
RPX. These differences could be driven by the different categor-
ical definitions used in the studies. We also believe that the dif-
ferences are driven by how the data is coded, analyzed, and re-
ported in these studies, and that a comparison of the actual 
raw data may demonstrate smaller differences between the 
studies’ results. 
One final point: while we are comparing the data regarding 
the number of cases filed, this metric, particularly after the 
change to the joinder rules, loses much of its significance. As 
we demonstrate above, the real change between 2010 and 2012 
is only in the number of lawsuits being filed, not in the number 
of accused infringers or in the number of patentees behind 
those cases. 
2. Number of Parties/Defendants 
Thus, the more important point of comparison pertains to 
the number of parties/defendants in the observed lawsuits. 
Feldman et al. found that in 2012 Monetizers sued 4,606 de-
fendants as compared to 3,832 defendants sued by Operating 
Companies and 579 defendants by Individuals or Trusts.137 
Breaking Feldman’s results into percentages, Monetizer de-
fendants comprised 49.90% of the total, Operating Companies 
41.51%, and Individuals 6.27%. RPX found that NPEs sued 
4,170 defendants in 2010 and 4,351 defendants in 2012.138 RPX 
concluded that NPE suits made up 55% of defendants sued in 
2010 and 61% in 2012.139 
In comparison, our data shows that Large Aggregators and 
Patent Holding Companies comprise, together, 34.06% (3,370) 
of the total number of parties in suits excluding the patentee in 
2010 and 39.45% (3,716) in 2012. Adding Individual/Family 
Trust cases increases the total number of parties in suits ex-
cluding the patentee to 4,504 (45.52%) in 2010 and 4,421 
(46.94%) in 2012. This is in contrast to Operating Company 
 
 137. Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 44. 
 138. RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 11 (Chart 5). 
 139. Id. at 12 (Chart 8). 
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cases, which involved 46.72% (4,622) of the parties in 2010 and 
45.10% (4,248) in 2012. 
The proper comparison between the studies is the percent-
ages since Feldman et al. and RPX report the number of de-
fendants among the various patentee categories, while we re-
port the total number of parties for our categories.140 And under 
this comparison, just as with the comparison of the number of 
cases filed, our data indicates that Patent Holding Companies 
and Large Aggregators make up a smaller percentage of de-
fendants than reported by Feldman et al. and RPX. Again, the-
se differences could be driven by the different categorical defi-
nitions used in these studies. We also believe that the 
differences are driven by how the data is coded, analyzed, and 
reported in these studies, and that comparison of the actual 
raw data could demonstrate smaller differences between these 
studies.  
C. CONSIDERING POTENTIAL INCREASES IN PATENT ASSERTIONS 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF OUR STUDY 
Our study carefully examines patent lawsuits filed in 2010 
and 2012. In this Section, we discuss theories that there was an 
increase in patent assertions that our study does not capture. 
First, our study is limited to 2010 and 2012. We chose 
those years because of the growing literature claiming that 
there was an explosion of PAE activity between 2010 and 2012. 
After we made a draft of our article public, opponents of PAEs 
acknowledged that the recent uptick was caused by the AIA 
joinder rules.141 After backing off the claim of a recent explo-
sion, some claim that there was a large increase in PAE activi-
ty earlier, namely from 2003 until 2010.142  
We offer several reactions. Initially, we note that all of the 
data purporting to show the increase from 2003 until 2010 is 
proprietary data gathered by private companies. We strongly 
believe that data relating to PAEs should be made publicly 
available for other researchers, including ourselves, to in-
 
 140. Again, given the small number of suits with more than one plaintiff 
and the even distribution of multiple plaintiff suits between the categories, we 
believe the total number of parties data adequately represents changes in the 
number alleged infringers in a given case, for a given category of patentee. 
 141. See James Bessen, ALL the Facts: PAEs Are Suing Many More Com-
panies, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/facts 
-suing-companies.html (noting a “minor error . . . affecting the period 2010 to 
2012.”).  
 142. See id. 
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spect.143 Putting aside the issue of publicly available data, we 
note that we suspect that these opponents of PAEs are correct. 
We believe, without having studied it empirically, there was a 
large increase in PAE activity in the earlier time period. In 
other words, our hypothesis is that more PAEs—especially Pa-
tent Holding Companies and Individual Inventors—
participated in the patent litigation system and sued more par-
ties in 2010 than in 2003. To confirm (or refute) this hypothe-
sis, one should empirically study litigation data from these 
years. A consistent definition must be used when comparing lit-
igation across the longer time period. We believe that a more 
granular definition, like the one used in the present study, 
which separates Universities, Individual Inventors, Failed 
Start-ups, Technology Development Companies, Patent Hold-
ing Companies, Operating Companies, etc., is important. Thus, 
while we suspect that there was an uptick in PAE litigation in 
the last ten years, we believe that more transparent and better 
data is needed to evaluate that hypothesis. But beyond PAEs, 
there has been a large increase in the total number of patent 
lawsuits filed each year from the early 1990s until the pre-
sent.144 Detailed, granular data about patent litigation across a 
long period of time would be beneficial to understanding chang-
es to the patent litigation ecosystem. 
Separate from patent litigation in the courts, there are an-
ecdotal stories of an increase in patent demand letters.145 Our 
study is limited to litigation in the federal courts, and does not 
capture patent demand letter activity. These private letters are 
notoriously difficult to accurately measure.  
D. FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH  
The granular data we have provided can be supplemented 
to shed more light on patent litigation. Below we list several 
research questions that we believe are ripe for investigation. 
We also note that we are presently gathering or acquiring in-
 
 143. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, & David L. Schwartz, The 
Value of Open Data for Patent Policy, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 20, 2014), http:// 
patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/value-patent-policy.html. 
 144. See Ron Katznelson, The America Invents Act at Work—The Major 
Cause for the Recent Rise in Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2013, 
12:59 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/15/aia-the-major-cause-for 
-rise-in-patent-litigation/id=39118. 
 145. See Joe Mullen, Patent Trolls Want $1,000 – For Using Scanners, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent 
-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners.   
SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:19 PM 
698 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:649 
 
formation to enable us to answer each of these questions. We 
take no position on the optimal number of patent lawsuits or 
the optimal number of lawsuits by Patent Holding Companies. 
We note, however, that Patent Holding Companies filed far 
more than a trace number of lawsuits. By sheer numbers of 
lawsuits, Patent Holding Companies are consequential to the 
patent litigation system.  
A critical question relates to the patents asserted by Patent 
Holding Companies. By definition, these entities were not in-
volved in the original inventive activity. Instead, they pur-
chased the patent from the inventors or another entity. Re-
search into the previous owners and chains of title of these 
patents is sorely needed. We are unsure at this point whether 
the patterns in previous patent ownership have changed be-
tween 2010 and 2012. Are these Patent Holding Company pa-
tents primarily from Individual Inventors, from Universities, 
from Operating Companies? Has the proportion changed over 
time? And there is another difficult to answer yet interesting 
question: How many of the Patent Holding Company cases in-
volve deals with Operating Companies to split the proceeds? 
These “privateering” arrangements are not typically publicly 
available, which makes them quite hard to study.146 
We also found that there were a small number of patent 
holders in both 2010 and 2012 who were responsible for suing a 
large number of defendants. Specifically, we found that 25% of 
the patent holders in 2010 and 2012 sued 75% of the defend-
ants. Even more pointedly, we found that 28 patent holders in 
2010 and 30 patent holders in 2012 sued 25% of all the defend-
ants. This asymmetric distribution in patent holders, with a 
small number of them suing a large number of defendants, 
raises numerous interesting questions about the nature of the-
se patent holders and the characteristics of the patents which 
were asserted against many defendants. We will leave this top-
ic for further exploration in the future.  
We also believe that more information regarding the out-
comes of patent suits is desirable. This will permit us to com-
pare how often type categories of patent holders are successful. 
And rather than just considering the overall success rate, we 
can consider the success rate of various parties in the distribu-
tion of cases. 
 
 146. See generally Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property 
Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2012) 
(analyzing the phenomenon of IP privateering). 
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Additionally, we believe that information about the dura-
tion of case pendency is salient. The longer a case pends, the 
higher the legal expenses in general. We suspect that the me-
dian Patent Holding Company case pends for shorter than the 
median Operating Company case. Information about pendency 
can inform the debate about the costs of PAE disputes and per-
haps provide insight into the merits of the disputes. 
Finally, we recognize that even our granular coding of pa-
tent holders has its limitations. Obviously, even the most gran-
ular categories are not homogeneous. There must be good and 
bad Patent Holding Company lawsuits, just as there are good 
and bad Operating Company lawsuits. To determine whether 
NPEs, PAEs, or Individual Inventors (or whatever group one is 
interested in) are good or bad (or a net cost or a net benefit to 
the system), one must first understand the make-up of the 
group and how it compares to other patent litigants. We wel-
come further refinements to our coding and other ideas on how 
one can tease out important heterogeneities within our groups.  
V.  CONCLUSION   
Profound changes appear to be occurring in the patent sys-
tem. There is a vigorous debate about which entities ought to 
be the rightful beneficiaries in a well-designed patent system 
and which entities are currently, in fact, reaping monetary re-
wards by asserting patents. Granular data on the identities of 
patent holder litigants is necessary to consider the arguments 
being advanced and to understand the implications of the 
changes to the patent system that we are experiencing. The 
present study provides such granular data, classifying patent 
holders into numerous categories including Failed Start-ups, 
Individual Inventors, Patent Holding Companies, Operating 
Companies, and Aggregators. It shows that the changes them-
selves are much more complex than previously understood. In 
order to promote free and open discussion of these important 
patent policy matters, we have also publicly released all our da-
ta and analysis at http://www.www.npedata.com.  
It appears that much of the recent increase in patent law-
suit filings resulted from the joinder rule changes in the AIA. 
Surprisingly, various litigation characteristics relating to Pa-
tent Holding Companies, such as the number of unique patent 
holders, total number of accused infringers, and the distribu-
tion of their litigation, appear nearly unchanged from 2010. Fi-
nally, Individual Inventor lawsuits still play a role in the pa-
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tent litigation system. This may be considered as a positive and 
previously unnoticed sign of the health of the patent system, 
depending upon one’s views of the patent system. Further 
study of the underlying patents in the disputes, including the 
origination of patents asserted by Patent Holding Companies, 
will be useful. 
  APPENDIX   
To further analysis of PAEs, we report in the Appendix the 
distribution of any of the particular different types of patentees 
changed between 2010 and 2012. We were particularly inter-
ested in Patent Holding Companies, Individual Inventors, and 
Operating Companies. To move even more granularly than 
quartiles, we separated each of these types of patent holders 
and then tabulated the cumulative distribution of defendants 
in each category. Figures 11, 12, and 13 below report our re-
sults. 
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FIGURE 11: Cumulative Distribution of Unique 
Individual Patentees 
 
 
FIGURE 12: Cumulative Distribution of Unique 
Patent Holding Company Patentees 
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FIGURE 13: Cumulative Distribution of Unique 
Operating Company Patentees 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the distribution for unique Individual 
Inventor patentees in 2010 and 2012. It appears the distribu-
tion has changed slightly between those years. In 2012, there 
are fewer total defendants, but the slope of the distribution is 
similar. Figure 11 shows the distribution of Patent Holding 
Companies in 2010 and 2012. There are slightly more defend-
ants in 2012, but the slope of the distribution is quite similar. 
However, the spacing between the points tells a slightly differ-
ent story. For both Patent Holding Companies and Individual 
Inventor patentees (with and without GeoTag included), pa-
tentees make up for more space between data points. These 
spaces are made up for in the bottom end in 2012, causing both 
years to be near equivalents overall. Put another way, the dis-
tribution is more even in 2012 than in 2010.  
Figure 12 contains the distribution of Operating Compa-
nies in 2010 and 2012. The lines overlap nearly completely, in-
dicating almost no change in the distribution between those 
two years. We wonder whether the similarities between all of 
these figures shows that what dominates behavior is not the 
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category of plaintiff, but rather something about patent law or 
litigation in general. 
Turning back to the unique Individual Inventor patentees, 
one company, GeoTag, was responsible for almost one third of 
all accused infringers in 2010. To investigate whether we were 
observing a “GeoTag effect,” in Figure 13 below we show the 
cumulative distribution after excluding GeoTag. Basically, 
GeoTag alone does not appear responsible for the different 
slopes and configurations of the distributions. Further investi-
gation is warranted. 
 
FIGURE 14: Cumulative Distribution of Unique In-
dividual Patentees (Excluding GeoTag) 
 
 
